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Abstract. We present a practical and highly secure method for the au-
thentication of chips based on a new concept for implementing strong
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) on field programmable gate arrays
(FPGA). Its qualitatively novel feature is a remote reconfiguration in
which the delay stages of the PUF are arranged to a random pattern
within a subset of the FPGA’s gates. Before the reconfiguration is per-
formed during authentication the PUF simply does not exist. Hence even
if an attacker has the chip under control previously she can gain no useful
information about the PUF. This feature, together with a strict renunci-
ation of any error correction and challenge selection criteria that depend
on individual properties of the PUF that goes into the field make our
strong PUF construction immune to all machine learning attacks pre-
sented in the literature. More sophisticated attacks on our strong-PUF
construction will be difficult, because they require the attacker to learn or
directly measure the properties of the complete FPGA. A fully functional
reference implementation for a secure “chip biometrics” is presented. We
remotely configure ten 64-stage arbiter PUFs out of 1428 lookup tables
within a time of 25 seconds and then receive one “fingerprint” from each
PUF within 1 msec.
Keywords: Strong Physical Unclonable functions (PUFs), Biometrics
of chips, Silicon Biometrics, Field programmable gate arrays
1 Introduction
”Physical unclonable functions” (PUFs) are innovative hardware devices that
shall be hard to reproduce physically because their functionality depends on
variance in the production or configuration process (e.g. in dopant levels) [14,2].
They promise to enable qualitatively novel security mechanisms e.g. for authen-
tication and key generation and distribution and have consequently become an
important research area of hardware security[17,22,21].
Secure authentication of a chip when its responses are obtained from a remote
location, i.e. when its physical properties cannot be directly examined, is an
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important security objective. In order to reach this objective, the chip’s func-
tionality must be unclonable not only physically but in general (“mathemati-
cal unclonability”[8]). This property is highly desirable e.g. for chips in bank-
ing cards and passports, but has proven to be very difficult to ensure against
well-equipped attackers on the authentication secrets in chips[19]. Mathemati-
cal unclonability with PUFs can be reached with so called “strong PUF” which
possesses a number of challenge - response (C-R) pairs that is so large that
an attacker with temporary access to the PUF cannot evaluate them all. PUF
constructions with an exponentially large number of C-R pairs have been con-
structed, e.g. the arbiter PUF[2]. It has proved possible to construct models of
such PUFs based on a relatively small number of C-R pairs by using machine-
learning programs[15,16,20]. With such a model, a simple piece of software can
emulate the remote PUF, thus breaking its security, completely. It is the major
aim of our contribution to present a qualitatively novel solution to this fun-
damental vulnerability of strong PUFs. The origin of the problem is that the
true information stored in arbiter PUFs is not exponentially large but relatively
small. The attacker only has to determine the relative delays of all stages in
order to build a complete model. If we estimate that the delay in one stage can
be quantified by 1 byte even an XOR PUF with 10 arbiter PUFs and 128 stages
each has a true information content only about 1.3 kbyte. It is true that this
information is harder to extract than information stored in a conventional unse-
cured memory. But because it is a straightforward exercise to construct simple
models in which this information appears as parameters it proves to be too easy
to extract it. Hence we need to require a qualitatively more difficult extraction
methodology and to increase the amount of stored information in the form of
manufacturing variations scalable and by a large factor.
The basic idea to meet this requirement is to employ a “second challenge” which
specifies how the PUF is to be reconstructed with a subset of gates of an FPGA
chip. If the power of this subset is large enough, there is an super-exponentially
large number of possible PUF constructions, whose properties the attacker can-
not all learn. Even if the attacker is in physical possession of the chip on which
the PUF will be realized, she thus remains deprived of the possibility to examine
the PUF which is finally used for authentication.
The security mechanism we employ for authentication is to compare a string of
single bit responses from a PUF, its “fingerprint”, with a previously recorded one
from the same PUF. We prefer this “chip biometrics” to authentication methods
based on secret keys, because it does not require to store any helper data for
error correction on the chip or to select challenges based on properties derived
from the chip. These practices reveal information about properties of the PUF.
Such information has been shown to allow very effective learning attacks on the
PUF employed in the authentication[1]. Because our security mechanism is to
deprive the attacker of any chance to learn anything about the authenticated
PUF, it reaches its full security potential.
Reconfigurable PUFs have been proposed before. Katzenbeisser et al.[4] and Lao
and Parhi[5] studied architectures in which the challenge - response behaviour is
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changed without modifying the PUF itself. Lao and Parhi[5] also proposed con-
structions in which the underlying PUF is modified in its properties. Zhang and
Lin[23] presented a scheme against replay attacks in which PUFs are completely
reconfigured on 16 different locations on an FPGA. Gehrer and Sigl[3] recon-
figured PUFs on an FPGA repeatedly to generate keys efficiently. Majzoobi et
al.[9] suggested the use of a “one time PUF” realized as a reconfigured arbiter
PUF on an FPGA that is used for a single authentication as a measure against
man in the middle attacks. Reconfiguration was not used as a measure against
machine-learning attacks before.
Contribution Our main contribution is a highly practical and efficient PUF based
authentication system that we hope reaches a security level that rivals the best
alternative technologies for authentication. Our contributions and insights are:
1. we develop a qualitatively new security mechanism that prevents in principle
that an attacker with temporary direct access to the FPGA has access to
the PUF that is later used for authentication. We thus present a strong PUF
immune to all machine learning attacks presented up to now in the literature.
2. we demonstrate that, contrary to widespread belief, an FPGA based arbiter
PUF with delay stages based on switched multiplexers offers a viable and
simple alternative to the more complex constructions based on delay lines
that have programmable lengths;
3. for the first time we employ a machine learning program as a tool for the
quantitative characterization of properties of arbiter PUFs, rather than only
for predicting its responses;
4. we completely avoid all risks from attacks on helper data or specially selected
subsets of challenges by strictly only using challenges that are random rela-
tive to the chip for which they are chosen and employing no error correction
(i.e. we perform a true “biometrics of the chip”).
Structure In Section 2 we supply the necessary background information on com-
ponents of our PUF construction and methods used for the characterization
of our PUF. Section 3 presents first our arbiter PUF design and then our au-
thentication architecture. The results of an experimental characterization of our
implementation are presented in Section 4. The discussion in Section 5 analyses
the security of our construction and Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Arbiter PUFs
An arbiter PUF[2,1,7] consists of a chain of N pairs of multiplexers (with an
“upper” and “lower” multiplexer) through which pass two signals that started
at the same time. Each multiplexer pair is controlled by one bit of a challenge
of N bits. If the challenge bit is 0 the upper (lower) signal is passed through the
upper (lower) multiplexer and if the challenge bit is 1 the upper (lower) signal
is passed through the lower (upper) multiplexer. The response bit is 0 (1) if the
lower (upper) signal arrives first at an arbiter at the end of the chain.
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Construction of arbiter PUFs on FPGAs The construction of arbiter PUFs
faces the demand to balance out crossing times for the two paths averaged over
the manufacturing induced fluctuations[10,13]. On FPGAs the detailed routing
on the fabric usually has to be balanced. Compared to PUF implementations
in ASICs, where routing is done by fixed circuit path connections, routing in
FPGAs has has much more influence on the path delays. Due to their flexible
design, a complex switching matrix is used to connect the logic elements to
each other. Hence the routing delay is mostly defined by the number of switches
involved and much less by the process variances of the gates. While it proved
possible to roughly balance the delay within and among the delay stages by
placing them symmetrically, the delays to the first delay stage and from the last
stage to the arbiter turn out to have imbalances due to a different routing that are
always at least an order of magnitude larger than the one due to manufacturing
variance[13]. If this demand is not met, the responses are no longer unique to the
individual PUF because the routing differences are of course the same on different
chips3 for the same PUF. Two solutions to this timing problem have been found.
The first one is to configure the lookup tables typically provided by FPGAs as
programmable delays lines instead of multiplexers and to tune an individual
arbiter PUF by placing delay elements only in one of the paths so that it is
perfectly balanced[10,11]. The other is to duplicate the PUF on different slices
of the FPGA and to compare the output of these PUFs with identical routing
(“double arbiter PUF”)[7]. It seems difficult to apply these solutions to our basic
approach of an arbiter PUF whose delay stages are placed at random positions
of the FPGA fabric. The former would require to balance each individual arbiter
for the large number of PUFs that need to be constructed. The latter solution
is not applicable if the PUF must be distributed over a considerable fraction of
the FPGA fabric as necessary for our approach. We therefore present another
solution to the routing problem in Section 3.1.
Learning attacks on arbiter PUFs The simplest topological timing model of
an arbiter PUF is the following[20]. The parameters δ0 and δ1 are the differences
in delay time between the multiplexers of one pair for a challenge bit of 0 and 1
respectively. The total delay time of in a n-stage arbiter PUF ∆Dn is then given
as:
∆Dn = ω
TΦ (1)
Here Φ a vector with the challenge bits as entry and ω is the following recursive
parameter:
ω1 = δ0,1 − δ1,1
ωi = δ0,i−1 + δ1,i−1 + δ0,i − δ1,i
ωn+1 = δ0,n − δ1,n (2)
3 Below “chip” will be a shorthand our FPGA and “PUF” for one instance of our
arbiter PUF construction.
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Here i in δ0,i stands for the i-th delay stage. It is possible to employ programs
for machine learning to estimate the vector of ω values. The estimate is often
good enough to predict the response values of an arbiter PUF which is then
completely broken as a strong PUF because it can be emulated with a piece
of software. We used a learning program based on logistic regression together
with the RPROP optimization (Section 3 in Tobisch & Becker[20]), to analyse
our implementation. Because the meaning of ω is not intuitive we calculated the
time difference of the delay difference of the upper and lower path for a challenge
bit 0 and a challenge bit 1 in each delay stage i:
∆δi = δ0,i − δ1,i (3)
This set of all ∆δi quantifies the functionality of the arbiter PUF. We obtained
∆δi by setting all δ0,i to 0. Then we inferred 64 ∆δi values and the value of δ0,64
from eq.(2). ∆δi remains dimensionless, because the absolute values of the delay
times have no influence on the responses.
2.2 Chip biometrics
Here we authenticate chips with a protocol that is roughly analogous to pro-
tocols for biometric authentication, e.g. with a fingerprint. A “basic protocol”
was discussed and realized with several types of ASIC-based PUFs by Maes[8].
This protocol consists of two phases, enrolment and verification. During the
enrolment phase the verifier records a subset of responses to randomly chosen
challenges (analogous to a subset of biometric features chosen) for each chip to
be deployed and stores them in a database together with an ID that identifies
the chip. During the verification a chip in the field sends its identifier to the
verifier. The verifier sends one of the stored challenges. The chip determines the
response to the challenge and sends it to the verifier. The chip is verified if this
response differs by less bits than a verification threshold t from the response
stored in the database.
According to Maes the main drawback of the basic protocol is that it can only
be employed in PUFs which cannot be cloned mathematically, i.e. which func-
tionality cannot be cloned in principle. Our main contribution is such a PUF,
and therefore we will present a realization of the basic protocol in section 3.2.
Rather than inventing a new nomenclature (like e.g. “FPGA signature”) we
continue to use the term “fingerprint” for our authenticating characteristic, but
keep the quotation marks to emphasize that this merely expresses the conceptual
similarity to biometrics.
2.3 The Smartfusion2 chip
We used the SmartFusion2 SoC from Microsemi Corp. for our project[12]. It
combines a 166 MHz ARM Cortex M3 microprocessor, a system controller for a
variety of hardware tasks and interfaces, embedded non-volatile memory (eNVM)
and an FPGA fabric on the same chip. Because our construction needs both a
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microprocessor and FPGA fabric this SoC is ideally suited, because the housing
of these components on the same chip eliminates many possible attack vectors
among these components. We used SmartFusion2 M2S-FG484 SOM starter kits
from Emcraft Systems for our investigations. The FPGA of this starter kit has
12084 “logic units” each of which consists of a look-up table (LUT) with four
inputs, a flip-flop and a carry signal from the neighbouring logic element. While
most of the characterizations of our implementation was performed in JTAG pro-
gramming mode, the authentication was also tested in the so called “in-system”
programming mode (ISP) in which the microprocessor receives data from an in-
terface (e.g. Ethernet and USB) and transfers it to the system controller which
then programs the FPGA and/or the eNVM.
3 Design of a biometric authentication system based on
remote random reconfiguration
3.1 Design of a random arbiter PUF
Fig. 1. Layout of arbiter PUF # 1 on the region of 1428 logical units on the FPGA.
The positions of the LUTs used to implement the multiplexers for the delay lines and
the interconnections between them are displayed.
In our implementation we realized an arbiter PUF with 64 delay stages. We
first present our solution to the problem of balanced timing announced in section
2.1. From a set of randomly chosen challenges we simply selected those challenges
for which the delay-time difference between the two signals happens to be close
to 0 fortuitously. We call these challenges “m-challenges” (m for metastable).
We employed two methods:
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1. We selected challenges with metastable responses (i.e. responses that flip be-
tween 0 and 1 when the same challenge is repeatedly applied) on a “reference
chip” that will never leave the customer’s security lab.
For the m-challenges the delay difference induced by routing and by manu-
facturing variance exactly balance on the reference chip. Therefore on other
chips the m-challenges will also lead to delay times that are expected to be
balanced up to time differences induced by manufacturing variance.
2. We modelled the reference chip with the machine-learning model explained
in section 2.1. We then used this model to calculate the predicted delay
difference d for a given challenge. Then we selected those challenges for
which d was smaller then a maximal bound b.
These two methods did not select the same challenges (i.e. our learning program
was not precise enough to always predict the challenges leading to metastability).
When we chose b = 0.24 the sets selected by the two different methods had
about equal power and were both suitable for the selection of m-challenges for
production. Fig.2 illustrates the distribution of delay-time differences and the
selection of the bounded sample.
Our construction is non-ideal because it just balances the routing delays (these
delays will be referred to as “routing induced delay” below) with the delays due
to manufacturing variance (“manufacturing induced delay”).
In order to allow for a very large number of possible arbiter PUF constructions
we selected a region of the FPGA fabric which includes of 84 × 17 = 1428 lookup
tables. We chose only a small subset of all available lookup tables to make our
scheme practical: the rest of the FPGA could still be used for other purposes. The
128 lookup tables used for the 64 delay stages of our arbiter PUF are selected
randomly from this set. The positions of the selected LUTs are stored in the
“core-cell-constraint” file. Fig. 1 displays the layout of random PUF # 1.
The decision of the response was performed in an arbiter which was not realized
as a flip-flop but with a LUT that evaluates the response R as (U AND L) OR
(U AND R), where U and L are the signal from the upper and low path of the
arbiter PUF. This construction yields a more symmetric and less temperature
dependent response of the arbiter. The VHDL code of our arbiter PUF is given
in the appendix.
3.2 Architecture and protocol of authentication system
Our authentication system works analogous to conventional biometrics and Maes’
basic protocol[8] (see section 2.2). In the enrolment phase a set of reference tem-
plates, consisting of the responses to a number of arbiter-PUF random layouts
as “2nd challenges”, together with 100 randomly chosen m-challenges, is deter-
mined and stored in a data base. Both these challenge-response pairs and the
random layouts the PUFs must be kept secret. The number of 2nd-challenge/100
4 The upper limit has no units because one cannot measure the absolute delay times
with machine learning programs.
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Fig. 2. The distribution of delay times calculated with a learning program for 50000
randomly chosen challenges. The delay times are dimensionless because the responses
do not depend on the absolute speed of the signals that determine them. The full curve
is a Gaussian fit to the data which has a mean value of -0.15 and a standard deviation
of 6.78. The region marked in red (light shaded) indicates the challenges that were
chosen as “m-challenges” because they lead to a small delay between the paths of the
arbiter PUF.
m challenge pairs must be sufficiently large for the intended application for the
chip authentication. Creating and maintaining such a database before the de-
ployment of the chip is a significant effort.
When a chip in the field is to be authenticated, two challenges are sent:
1. a novel type of challenge, which consist of the compiled VHDL code that
determines the configuration of the FPGA. This challenge, which always has
a size of 556 kbyte for our FPGA5, is transferred by the M3 microprocessor
to the system controller which then programs the FPGA within a time of at
most 28 seconds 6.
2. 100 conventional 64 bit long m-challenges that decide the multiplexers’ set-
tings. The 100 responses are defined to be the “fingerprint” of the chip and
are sent to the authenticating party. It took about 10 µsecs to obtain a single
response to an m-challenge.
This procedure is sketched in Fig. 3. It is identical to Maes’ basic protocol
except that instead of challenge-response pairs, 2nd-challenge and m-challenge -
response pairs have to be sent. The authenticating party calculates the Hamming
distance between the template and the “fingerprint”. Only if this Hamming
distance is smaller than a certain threshold t, the chip is authenticated.
5 The SmartFusion2 chip does not support a partial reconfiguration of the FPGA.
6 With JTAG programming the total programming cycle took 25 seconds.
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Fig. 3. Authentication procedure of a SmartFusion2 chip.
Both the novel and the m-challenge are analogous just to the information on
which part of the human body (e.g. which finger) is to be used for authentication.
4 Experimental Results of Tests with the Implementation
4.1 Characterization of arbiter PUFs
We characterized the properties of ten different randomly placed arbiter PUFs
in a climate chamber at different temperatures. Firstly we verified that our
construction is really a functional arbiter PUF:
1. by applying the learning program discussed in Section 2.1 in order to test
if our designs can be modelled as arbiter PUFs which show manufacturing
variances.
2. by directly testing if m-challenges that lead to metastable responses on the
reference chip do mostly not lead to metastability bits in other chips in-
stances due to manufacturing variance.
Fig.4 shows the difference of delay differences of the 64 stages of ten arbiter PUFs
obtained with about 20 - 30 iterations of their machine-learning program. One
recognizes that, as expected, the difference of delays differences vary strongly
among the PUFs because the routing depends strongly on the random positions
of the delay stages on the FPGA fabric. We succeeded to predict the responses
to random challenges with an error rate of about 1.4 %. Fig.5 shows the dif-
ference of delay differences (see eq.(3)) of the 64 stages of one randomly placed
arbiter PUF in three different chips, relative to the mean of the delay differences.
Even though we are sure that the derived delay differences are correct, because
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Fig. 4. The difference of delay differences with a challenge bit 0 and 1 of the 64 stages
of ten randomly placed arbiter PUFs. The time is in dimensionless units because it
is derived from a machine learning program. See eq.(3) for a precise definition of the
difference of delay differences.
they enable a correct prediction of responses, we did not achieve a deeper under-
standing of their distribution, e.g. of the surprisingly strong correlation of the
delay values in consecutive stages7. The inter-chip differences in Fig.5 are mainly
due to manufacturing variance. Their mean absolute values were found to be a
factor of 29.6 smaller than the differences among chips with a different layout
in Fig.4. This confirms the well known fact that in a multiplexer based arbiter
PUF design the delays are dominated by differences in the routing (Morozov et
al.[13] found that they dominate by a factor of 25.6 in their FPGA.)
Table 1 shows the fractions of ones for 10 randomly chosen m-challenges on two
further chips. An analysis of 1000 m-challenges found that only about 10 % of
all m-challenges on chip A also lead to metastable bits on chip B and C. Here
a metastable bit is defined as a bit that flips at least once when the challenge
is applied 100000 times. This confirms that the responses of m-challenges are
strongly influenced by manufacturing variance. Moreover this fraction is much
larger than the one for randomly chosen challenges which we found to be 0.72
%8.
The randomness of the responses of our PUFs was found to depend on the place-
ment strategy. Therefore we needed to test uniformity, uniqueness and reliability
of our PUF with the finally chosen placement strategy that is described in Sec-
tion 3.1. Uniformity was determined as the bias9 of our construction displayed
7 We will argue below (Section 5) that the difficulty of understanding the routing
enhances the security of our design by obfuscation.
8 Therefore our PUF construction has 0.0072 × 264 = 1.3 × 1017 m-challenges.
9 Here we define the bias as (# of ones)−(# of zeros)
(# of ones)+(# of zeros)
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Fig. 5. The difference of delay differences of the 64 stages of one randomly placed
arbiter PUF in three different chips. The delay difference are plotted relative to the
mean of the three values, i.e. only the deviation relative to the mean value is shown.
Table 1. The fraction of ones for 10 m-challenges that lead to a metastable response on
chip A. Due to manufacturing variance the r-responses mostly do not lead to metastable
responses on chip B and C. The first 10 bits of the fingerprint of chip B and C can be
read from the table. If the fraction lies between 0 and 100 % the respective bits will
be noisy.
Challenge Frac on of 1s, Chip A Frac on of 1s, Chip B Frac on of 1s, Chip C 
7323654688874139733  45,92%  100%  0%  
11845416167999726454  6,66%  0%  100%  
2814503641960336764  53,16%  100%  100%  
670509234023467077  5,24%    48,61%  100%  
14797980534726803933  53,59%  100%  100%  
16595764706100376029  63,21%  0%  16,13%  
1887583556430087243  15,29%  100%  0%  
1116720592540295842  83,56%  0%  0%  
18126161473406108233  68,83%    0,01%  0%  
11508568743664487972  53,34%    98,39%  100%  
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(fig.6). The data shown in Fig.6 have a mean bias of 4.9 %, that is clearly larger
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Fig. 6. The bias of 10 randomly placed arbiter PUFs displayed for 100000 randomly
chosen challenges.
than the one expected from statistical fluctuations for our test of 0.3 % but still
acceptable for fingerprints that do not have to be perfectly random. Moreover
the bias is in a range commonly considered to be acceptable for physical random
number generators[6].
The uniqueness of our PUF was quantified as the mean Hamming distance of a
“fingerprint” of different chips in the same configuration (fig.7). It has a value
of 29.7 which is significantly different from the maximal value of 50, i.e. the
relative entropy among two bits from different chips is only 0.88. This is not a
problem for our application, as the bits in biometric templates commonly have
an entropy smaller than 1. The reduced value can be understood as an effect of
our method to choose challenges that yield a metastable response on a reference
chip. On the reference chip (see Section 3.1) metastability means that routing
and manufacturing variation induced delay are exactly balanced. On the chips
that are compared, the routing delay will be the same as on the reference chip
but the manufacturing induced delay will be different in general. There is a 50 %
chance that manufacturing induced delay between the paths will have the same
sign as the the one of the routing induced delay on the chips to be compared.
In this case their response will always be identical. If the delay has an opposite
sign on both chips there is a 50 % chance that this will lead to a different re-
sponse because the distribution of manufacturing and routing induced delays in
our selected sample of challenges must be the same by design. This argument
predicts a mean Hamming distance of 25 and the value we found is similar. The
agreement of the Hamming distances induced by manufacturing variations in
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Fig. 7. The distribution of 4000 Hamming distances of “fingerprint” of chip B and
C. The continuous curve is a Gauss curve with the same mean (29.71) and standard
deviation (4.57) as the data points.
delay times in Fig.7 with a Gaussian distribution is excellent. This suggests that
the bits in our “fingerprints” are distributed randomly, because for the mean
value of 29.7 a Gaussian is an excellent approximation to the binomial distribu-
tion that is expected if the matching probabilities are described by a Bernoullie
process.
The reliability was tested by measuring the noise in the “fingerprint” as a func-
tion of temperature. We found that the noise is caused exclusively by a metasta-
bility of the arbiter that develops when the the transit times are nearly exactly
balanced so that the both input pulses occur simultaneously. We identified all
metastable bits in a sample of 10000 challenges and its fraction of ones f1. The
probability P that metastable bit i induces a noise bit, i.e. different responses to
consecutive identical challenges is:
Pi = 2fi(1− fi) (4)
The total noise fraction N determined with j metastable bits is then:
N =
∑
i Pi
j
(5)
In this manner we obtained N = 1.04 % and 1.59 % for two chips. N did
not change significantly with temperature in the range 5 oC - 60 oC. How-
ever we found that even though its power remained roughly constant the set of
metastable bits changed with temperature because some bits became stable and
others became metastable. While the mean Hamming distance between consec-
utively taken responses with random challenges on the same PUF was 0.08 ±
0.026 % it rose to 0.35 ± 0.058 % when responses taken at 5 oC and 60 oC are
compared.
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4.2 FAR (interchip comparison) and FRR (intrachip comparison)
Analogously to the common definition in biometrics, the false acceptance rate
(FAR) is the probability that the biometric system authenticates a chip incor-
rectly and the false rejection rate (FRR) is the probability that the system does
not authenticate incorrectly. We had seen in the previous section 4.1 that the
distribution of matching bits in “fingerprint” taken from two different chips is
random and the probability for a non-match has a certain value p (p=0.297 in
our case). Under these circumstances we obtain:
FAR =
t∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− p)(n−i)pi (6)
where t is the threshold for the number of bits up to which two “fingerprints”
that are classified a belonging to the same chip can differ. If we choose t = 12 we
find that for our construction FAR = 2.4 × 10−5. The FRR is the probability
that more than t bit non-matches occur in two “fingerprints” of the same chip.
We estimated the FRR by determining the 10000 Hamming distances among
“fingerprints” of the same arbiter PUF. Their distribution is plotted in Fig.8
We then performed a fit of these data to a binomial probability distribution and
used this fit to determine the FRR in a manner analogous to eq.(6) to FRR = 7.2
× 10−9. The underlying extremely conservative assumption of using a binomial
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Fig. 8. The distribution of 10000 Hamming distances of “fingerprint” of chip B with
each other. The continuous curve is a fit to a binomial distribution with the same mean
(1,28) as the data points.
distribution to fit these data is that each bit has a mean probability of 1.3 %
to have a different value in two consecutive measurements. In reality we found
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that the noise for the 100 m-challenges we employed to obtain the “fingerprint”
comes from six metastable bits with a fraction of ones different from 1 or 0 by
more than 0.1 %. It is then much less probable to obtain a Hamming distance
larger than 6 than expected by a binomial distribution. As a detailed noise model
is beyond the scope of the present paper we contend ourselves with the above
conservative upper bound on the FRR.
5 Discussion of the security of our design
As a first attempt to break our construction the attacker could try to use the
100 challenge - response pairs that were sent to obtain the “fingerprint” and
could be intercepted by her to model the PUF. However we found that it took
at least about 2000 challenge-response training pairs for a successful model. It is
conceivable that a smaller number might suffice to construct a model, however
it seems certain that 100 C - R pairs are not sufficient, because they contain an
information content not larger than 100 bits which is insufficient to encode the
64 difference of delay difference values that constitute the model.
Another obvious attack on our construction would be an attempt to model all
arbiter PUFs that can be constructed when the PUF is under physical control
of the attacker. A conservative estimate of the number of PUFs that can be
constructed with our implementation defines PUFs to be different only if they
contain different gates, i.e. all PUFs with identical gates that are only put into
a different configuration are counted as a single PUF. We then estimate the
number of PUFs NPUF as:
NPUF =
(
1428
128
)
≈ 4.7× 10185 (7)
Clearly such a number of PUFs cannot even be configured on the FPGA. Even if
(theoretically) each reconfiguration could somehow be accelerated to take only a
pico-second this would still take 1.6 × 10166 years. Therefore the only promising
possibility is an attack that faithfully models the timing of the subset of lookup
tables selected from the FPGA and the gates used for the routing between them.
There are two security mechanisms that make this attack difficult. The first one
is largely due to the need for reverse engineering: It will be more difficult to con-
struct a model of a complex dynamical FPGA system than of the simple static
arbiter PUF system. It seems likely that as a first step the attacker needs to
reverse engineer the FPGA in order to obtain a topological model of the FPGA
fabric. This model enables the attacker to identify all components that influence
the delays and to predict how these components are combined in the connec-
tions between delay elements, the switching matrix for routing and the arbiter.
Only equipped with such a construction model she will be able to understand
the distribution of the delay times of the stages we determined (but did not
understand, yet) in Section 4. Without such a model she would need to learn or
measure the delays between each delay element and all other delay elements, a
number of delays that increases y with the already large number of components.
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This reverse engineering step is analogous to the one necessary in attacks on
authentication secrets stored in conventional memories and protected by sensors
or other protection mechanisms. Once the reverse engineering is completed, this
security mechanism is broken and further chips can be attacked with relatively
little effort. At this point a second, PUF specific, protection mechanism kicks
in: Even on a reverse engineered FPGA the attacker needs to find out about the
manufacturing variations of the delays of all elements of the PUF that are used
in our construction. In our implementation she needs to determine the properties
of 1428 lookup tables, i.e. the individual delays of each of them and of all gates
that are used in interconnecting them. This makes a complete and linear char-
acterization directly in the hardware (e.g. with techniques developed by Tajik
et al.[18]) or with the use of learning programs a time-consuming task on each
individual chip that is to be modelled. This security mechanism is easily scaled:
if an attacker will succeed to break our security mechanism in an unacceptably
short time, one can increase the number of lookup tables out of which the PUFs
are constructed. In this manner our PUF construction promises to make cloning
impossible based on physical principles rather than lack of knowledge about the
protection method and technical skill to break it. Our second protection mecha-
nism requires a level of effort to clone a chip that does not significantly decrease
when the protection mechanism is fully understood by the attacker.
6 Conclusion
We presented a qualitatively novel concept to increase the security of strong
PUFs. Up to now most attempts to make PUFs more secure aimed at making the
individual PUF construction more complex, e.g. by performing an XOR between
several PUFs. This strategy is limited by the need to keep the final output
sufficiently reliable. Our strategy was to keep the individual PUF simple but to
force the attacker to model not only the static PUF but a part of a dynamical
FPGA system. This concept enabled a qualitative increase the complexity of the
system that has to be modelled compared to previous constructions. The only
fundamental limit to increasing it further is the available size of the FPGA fabric.
Our FPGA-based arbiter PUF design itself is simpler than the ones proposed up
to now. The price one has to pay for the gain in security is an additional overhead
for the sending of the “2nd challenge” that specifies a reconfiguration of the PUF.
However, it is not necessary to introduce this overhead for each authentication.
From the 1428 LUTs assigned to our construction in our implementation it is
possible to construct 10 arbiter PUFs with one second challenge, so that only
every 10th authentication needs the additional overhead.
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Appendix
VHDL Code for our arbiter PUF construction. “above” and “below” stand for
the upper and lower signal pathes. [...] stands for the insertion of 62 additional
consecutive, identical sub-parts of the code.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
-- Company: XXX
-- File: Arbiter_PUF.vhd
-- Description:
-- Arbiter Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)
-- Submodul to evaluate response from Arbiter PUF.
-- The input challenge defines the connection of a row of different gates.
-- An Arbiter at the end of this gates evaluates which of the two signals
arrived first
-- and sets the corresponding response.
-- Targeted device: <Family::SmartFusion2> <Die::M2S150> <Package::FG1152>
-- Author: XXX
-- Date: 12.2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
library IEEE;
use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all;
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use IEEE.numeric_std.all;
entity Arbiter_PUF is
port (
c : IN std_logic_vector(63 downto 0); -- challenge
enable : IN std_logic; -- enable signal for arbiter puf
dc : IN std_logic; -- don’t care input for LUTs
ready : OUT std_logic; -- ready signal
r : OUT std_logic -- response
);
end Arbiter_PUF;
architecture architecture_Arbiter_PUF of Arbiter_PUF is
-- signal, component etc. declarations
attribute syn_keep : boolean;
signal above : std_logic := ’0’;
signal c0 : std_logic := ’0’;
signal above0,above1, [...],above64 : std_logic := ’0’; --
top arbiter puf signals
signal below : std_logic := ’0’;
signal below0,below1, [...] ,below64 : std_logic := ’0’; --
bottom arbiter puf signals
-- set syn_keep for PUF signals to prevent removing in synthesis optimization
attribute syn_keep of above,above0,above1, [...] ,above64,
below,below0,below1, [...]
,below64,c0 : signal is true;
begin
-- architecture body
above0 <= above when (c0= ’0’ and dc = ’0’) else below;
below0 <= below when (c0= ’0’ and dc = ’0’) else above;
-- challenge 0
above1 <= above0 when (c(0)= ’0’ and dc = ’0’) else below0;
below1 <= below0 when (c(0)= ’0’ and dc = ’0’) else above0;
-- challenge 1
above2 <= above1 when (c(1)= ’0’ and dc = ’0’) else below1;
below2 <= below1 when (c(1)= ’0’ and dc = ’0’) else above1;
[...]
-- challenge 63
above64 <= above63 when (c(63)= ’0’ and dc = ’0’) else
below63;
below64 <= below63 when (c(63)= ’0’ and dc = ’0’) else
above63;
---- Arbiter to generate response
r <= (below64 and not(above64)) or (below64 and r);
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-- ENABLE PROCESS
process--(enable)
begin
wait on enable;
if(enable = ’1’) then
above <= ’1’;
below <= ’1’;
-- wait until response is generated
wait on r;
ready <= ’1’;
else -- enable = ’0’
above <= ’0’;
below <= ’0’;
ready <= ’0’;
end if;
end process;
end architecture_Arbiter_PUF;
